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Do Bills of Rights Matter? An
Examination of Court Change, Judicial
Ideology, and the Support Structure for
Rights in Canada
DONALD R. SONGER, SUSAN W. JOHNSON &
JENNIFER BARNES BOWIE *
Competing theories regarding the development of a “rights revolution” in Canada have appeared
in the judicial and constitutional literature in recent years. On the one hand, scholars argue
that the profound effects often attributed to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms are substantially
overstated, and conventional analyses have overlooked the more important role of changes in
what is called the “support structure” for rights. Others have advanced a competing theory
that the Charter created an expansion of civil liberties. We take advantage of an extensive
dataset on the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada to provide a more systematic test
of these competing theories. We conclude that the adoption of the Charter had effects on
both the rights agenda and the constitutional issues agenda of the Court, which were both
substantively large and statistically significant. There was some indication that changes in
agenda control mattered, but the effects were not consistent across our time-series models.
The more limited claim that increases in the support structure are one of multiple factors
that are associated with agenda change received only mixed support. In short, we found that
bills of rights do matter.
Des théories concurrentes sur l’avènement d’une « révolution des droits » au Canada
se sont manifestées au cours des dernières années dans la documentation judiciaire et
constitutionnelle. D’une part, des chercheurs soutiennent que les effets profonds souvent
attribués à la Charte des droits et libertés sont sensiblement surestimés et que les analyses
traditionnelles ont sous-évalué le rôle plus important de l’évolution survenue dans ce qu’on
appelle la « structure de soutien » des droits. D’autres avancent une théorie concurrente
voulant que la Charte ait conduit à une amplification des libertés civiles. Nous tirons parti
d’une vaste banque de données relatives aux jugements de la Cour suprême du Canada afin
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de mettre plus systématiquement à l’épreuve ces théories concurrentes. Nous arrivons à la
conclusion que l’adoption de la Charte a entraîné un effet à la fois important et statistiquement
significatif sur les priorités de la Cour tant dans le domaine des droits que dans celui des
questions constitutionnelles. Il semblerait qu’une évolution soit survenue dans les priorités,
mais que les effets n’aient pas été uniformes dans tous nos modèles de série chronologique.
L’idée plus restreinte que l’évolution de la structure de soutien figure au nombre des multiples
facteurs associés à l’évolution des priorités n’a reçu qu’un soutien mitigé. Bref, nous avons
découvert que les déclarations des droits possèdent une importance bien réelle.
I.

EFFECTS OF CONSTITUTIONS AND BILLS OF RIGHTS ................................................................... 300

II.

SUPPORT STRUCTURES AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE INFLUENCE OF CONSTITUTIONS ............ 303

III.

OTHER INFLUENCES ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOUR ............................................................................. 304

IV.

PROBLEMS WITH THE ASSUMED PRIMACY OF THE SUPPORT STRUCTURE ................................ 306

V.

A MODEL OF SUPREME COURT AGENDA CHANGE ......................................................................... 308

VI.

TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................... 312

VII.

RESULTS............................................................................................................................................ 313
A.
Trends in the Court’s Agenda—A First Look ...................................................................... 313
B.
Change in the Rights Agenda of the Supreme Court of Canada: Percentage of Rights
Cases per year 1945–2005 ................................................................................................. 314
C.
Change in the Judicial Review of Statutes Agenda of the Supreme Court of Canada
1945–2005. .......................................................................................................................... 315
D.
Change in the Judicial Review of Laws and Executive Action Struck Down by the
Supreme Court of Canada 1945–2005................................................................................ 316
E.
Agenda Change in Constitutional Cases in the Supreme Court of Canada 1945–2005 .... 317
F.
A Statistical Analysis of Agenda Change............................................................................ 319

VIII. DISCUSSION ...................................................................................................................................... 326
APPENDIX ................................................................................................................................................... 328

SCHOLARS HAVE BEEN INTERESTED in what influences higher court agendas in

the United States1 and other countries.2 In this vein, they have examined the extent
1.

2.

HW Perry, Jr, Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in in the United States Supreme Court
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991); Donald R Songer, Reginald S Sheehan &
Susan B Haire, Continuity and Change on the United States Courts of Appeals (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2000).
Roy B Flemming, “Processing Appeals for Judicial Review: The Institutions of Agenda
Setting in the Supreme Courts of Canada and the United States” in Martin Westmacott and
Hugh Mellon, eds, Political Dispute and Judicial Review: Assessing the Work of the Supreme
Court of Canada (Scarborough: Thompson Learning, 2000) 40 [Flemming, “Processing
Appeals”]; Roy B Flemming, Tournament of Appeals: Granting Judicial Review in Canada
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004) [Flemming, Tournament of Appeals];
Peter McCormick, Supreme at Last: The Evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto:
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to which constitutional bills of rights matter in terms of influencing high court
dockets.3 Understandably, because of the relatively recent passage of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms4 in Canada, scholars have been particularly curious
about the impact of the Charter on the Supreme Court of Canada’s (the Court)
docket. Within the literature on Canadian courts, there is a debate regarding
whether passage of the Charter substantially impacted the Court’s agenda. On
one side of the debate, it is argued that the profound effects often attributed to
the Charter are substantially overstated and that the structures supporting rights
are what greatly influenced the Court’s agenda. This view, held by scholars such
as Charles L. Epp, suggests that bills of rights matter, “but only to the extent that
individuals can mobilize the resources necessary to invoke them through strategic
litigation.”5
On the other side of the debate, some suggest that the Charter was the cause
of the expansion of civil liberties and rights throughout Canada.6 While some have
suggested that this increased emphasis on the protection of rights is attributed
to legislative activism,7 we, like other scholars,8 take a court-centered approach

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.
8.

James Lorimer, 2000) [McCormick, Supreme at Last]; Rachel Sieder, Line Schjolden & Alan
Angell, eds, The Judicialization of Politics in Latin America (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2005); C Neal Tate, “Courts and Crisis Regimes: A Theory Sketch with Asian Case Studies”
(1993) 46:2 Pol Res Q 311.
Charles R Epp, “Do Bills of Rights Matter? The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms”
(1996) 90:4 Am Poli Sci Rev 765 [Epp, “Do Bills of Rights Matter?”]; Linda Camp Keith,
“Constitutional Provisions for Individual Human Rights (1977-1996): Are They More than
Mere ‘Window Dressing?’” (2002) 55:1 Poli Res Q 111; Rainer Knopff & FL Morton,
Charter Politics (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1992) [Knopff & Morton, Charter Politics].
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c
11 [Charter]. The Charter was adopted in 1982, but the first case raising a Charter claim did
not reach the Court until 1984.
Epp, “Do Bills of Rights Matter?,” supra note 3 at 765. See also Charles R Epp, The Rights
Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1998) [Epp, Rights Revolution].
Sebastien Lebel-Grenier, “The Charter and Legitimization of Judicial Activism” in Paul Howe
& Peter H Russell, eds, Judicial Power and Canadian Democracy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2001) 94; Christopher P Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter: Canada
and the Paradox of Liberal Constitutionalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993)
[Manfredi, Judicial Power]; Donald R Songer, The Transformation of the Supreme Court of
Canada: An Empirical Examination (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008).
James B Kelly, Governing with the Charter: Legislative and Judicial Activism and Framers’ Intent
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005).
Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Scarborough: Thomson Canada, 2001); Bernard
W Funston & Eugene Meehan, Canada’s Constitutional Law in a Nutshell, 2d ed (Scarborough:
Thomson Canada, 1998); Raul A Sanchez Urribarri et al, “Explaining Changes to Rights
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in addressing whether bills of rights matter. Using more recently collected data
than some previous studies, we provide a more comprehensive analysis of these
alternative perspectives. Specifically, we take advantage of an extensive dataset
on the decisions of the Court to provide a more systematic test of the support
structure thesis and competing theories of agenda change. Using this new data, we
create numerical measures of the main components of the support structure thesis.
Next, we test the effects of these measures on the Court’s changing agenda using
a time-series analysis of changes in the agenda of the Court over a fifty-seven year
period running from 1949 to 2005. The time-series analysis includes measures
of judicial ideology, changes in the Court’s docket, and power of judicial review
under the Charter, along with measures of the support structure. We find there is
mixed evidence that increases in the support structure are positively related to an
increased presence of rights issues on the docket. More importantly, we find that
the adoption of the Charter had a profound effect on changes in the rights agenda
of the Court, an effect that remains strong even after controls for changes in the
support structure, judicial ideology, and docket control are included in the model.

I. EFFECTS OF CONSTITUTIONS AND BILLS OF RIGHTS
Bills of rights are not self-executing; such constitutional provisions will only
be effective if there are litigants and lawyers to bring cases, judges prepared to
implement the constitutional procedures, and governments willing to abide by the
rulings of the courts. Scholars disagree about the extent to which judges, external
actors, or institutional structures matter in the attainment of rights. Cultural
explanations for rights revolutions suggest that support structures must exist
in order for rights to be obtained, and that such support structures may largely
account for the achievement of rights in various societies.9 Other scholars stress
what they perceive to be the relatively greater importance of constitutional bills
of rights for the attainment of rights. Resurgences in studying the importance of
constitutions have occurred in recent years,10 with rational choice theory becoming

Litigation: Testing a Multivariate Model in a Comparative Framework” (2011) 73:2 J Pol 391.
9. Epp, “Do Bills of Rights Matter,” supra note 3; Epp, Rights Revolution, supra note 5.
10. Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, “A Revisionist View of the Separation of Powers” (1994)
6:3 J Theoretical Pol 345; Douglas Greenberg et al, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy:
Transitions in the Contemporary World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Stephen
Holmes, Passions and Constraints: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1995); Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry
into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes (New York: New York University Press, 1994).
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more accepted in the fields of comparative politics and judicial studies.11 This
resurgence in the study of the impact in constitutions is fueled in large part by the
observation that virtually all of the newer democracies in Eastern and Southern
Europe and in Latin America have adopted bills of basic rights as parts of their
new constitutions.12 Tom Ginsburg argues that these new constitutions, with their
associated mechanisms for judicial review of government action, facilitate democracy
because they provide a form of “insurance” to prospective electoral losers.13 But until
very recently, there were virtually no empirical studies of the effects of these new bills
of rights.14 That changed recently with the first attempt to quantitatively assess the
impact of written constitutional rights provisions on the reduction of state terror.
Undertaking a broad cross-national analysis of countries with populations of at least
one hundred-thousand, Linda Camp Keith, C. Neal Tate, and Steven C. Poe found
that the adoption of nine specific constitutional protections of civil liberties were
significantly associated with lower levels of the abuse of civil liberties.15
The comparative literature on courts also emphasizes the importance of bills
of rights to judicial decision making and agenda change. On this point, David
G. Barnum found that India’s judicial activism and constitutional due process are
linked.16 Mary L. Volcansek found that the Constitutional Court in Italy managed
to strengthen its power of judicial review in strategic ways and increase a civil
liberties agenda, despite external attempts by the state to thwart its efforts.17 This
line of research on the institutional impact of bills of rights in the courts of different
11. Mark Irving Lichbach & Alan S Zuckerman, eds, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture
and Structure (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Margaret Levi, “A
Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis” in
Mark Irving Lichbach & Alan S Zuckerman, eds, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture
and Structure (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 19; Mancur Olson Jr,
The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); Gary W Cox
& Mathew D McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1993); Douglass C North, Institutions, Institutional Change
and Economic Performance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
12. Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); Seider, Schjolden & Angell, supra note 2.
13. Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in East Asia (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 18.
14. Hirschl, supra note 12.
15. “Is the Law a Mere Parchment Barrier to Human Rights Abuse?” (2009) 71:2 J Pol 644.
16. “Article 21 and Policy Making Role of Courts in India: An American Perspective” (1988) 30
JILI 19.
17. “Judicial Activism in Italy” in Kenneth M Holland, ed, Judicial Activism in Comparative
Perspective (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1991) 117.
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countries builds on previous research surrounding what C. Neal Tate and Torbjorn
Vallinder refer to as the judicialization of politics.18
An extensive recent scholarship has assessed the impact of the Charter
on judicial decision making without producing agreement as to whether the
effect has been positive or negative. Michael Mandel argues that the Charter
has led to the “legalization” of politics, and that this change has benefited
wealthy interests.19 Allan C. Hutchinson takes a similar approach, suggesting
that judicial implementation of the Charter does not lead to social progress.20
In contrast, Rainer Knopff and F.L. Morton emphasize top-down approaches,
whereby bills of rights and judicial activism encourage interest group litigation
and support structures to emerge.21 Knopff and Morton suggest that the Court
uses the Charter to advance its activist agenda, which has helped to transfer
power to left wing social activists.22 They contend that the Charter does not
cause the extension of rights to minority groups in Canada; rather, judicial
activism and a conscious decision on the part of activist judges to use the
Charter in this way have led to decisions that benefit certain special interests.
While Christopher P. Manfredi takes a less explicitly ideological approach,
he too notes that the adoption of the Charter has had a profound effect on
the development of judicial power and the agenda of the Court, leading to
increasing concerns about the tension between judicial review and liberal
constitutionalism.23 These critiques of the Charter’s policy impact led to a
recent assessment that “[v]irtually all scholars who have joined the debate over
this new policy-making role of the Court seem to have assumed … that the
Charter of Rights was the critical event that enabled the Court … to adopt a
more overtly political role.”24

18. The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (New York: New York University Press, 1995).
19. The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto: Thompson
Education, 1989).
20. Waiting for a Coraf: A Critique of Law and Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1995).
21. Charter Politics, supra note 3; FL Morton, “The Political Impact of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms” (1987) 20:1 Can J Poli Sci 31 at 39.
22. The Charter Revolution and the Court Party (Toronto: Broadview Press, 2000).
23. Manfredi, Judicial Power, supra note 6; see also Christopher P Manfredi, Judicial Power and
the Charter: Canada and the Paradox of Liberal Constitutionalism, 2d ed (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2001).
24. Songer, supra note 6, at 71.
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II. SUPPORT STRUCTURES AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE
INFLUENCE OF CONSTITUTIONS
Some scholars have suggested that there are reasons to be skeptical that a bill of
rights by itself will have much effect on either an increasing presence of rights
issues on the agendas of top courts or on judicial support for rights claimants. For
instance in Canada, Epp argues that the passage of the Charter in 1982 had only a
modest effect on the emergence of either a rights agenda or on increased judicial
review by the Court.25 Instead, he suggests that it was increases in the support
structure for legal mobilization, assisted by increasing judicial docket control,
that had the greatest impact on the development of a rights agenda on the Court.
Epp develops a theoretically rich account of why strong support structures for
rights are essential for developing a strong rights agenda on appellate courts and
for increasing judicial support for rights. He further suggests that the extent of
judicial control over its own docket is important for the development of a rights
agenda. In particular, he notes that the influence of judicial attitudes that favour
rights expansion is “conditioned by the extent of discretionary control that judges
have over their docket.”26 Furthermore, Epp maintains that only when there is an
adequate support structure for rights will courts participate in a “rights revolution.”27
As Epp envisions it, this support structure will consist primarily of organized
group support for rights, financing (particularly government financing) for rights
litigation, and a legal profession that is racially and ethnically diverse and open to
women. Raul A. Sanchez Urribarri et al build upon the support structure theory
in suggesting that while at least some minimal or threshold level is necessary in
the “support structure for rights,” it is less clear that incremental increases above
those threshold levels of the support structure will increase the number of rights
cases on the agenda of a top court.28
As evidence for the support structure theory, Epp examines the growth of the
support structure and changes in the rights agenda and rights support before and
after the adoption of the Charter. 29 He explains that in order to demonstrate the
importance of support structures, one needs to test their influence compared to
several important alternative explanations, including the effects of a constitutional
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Epp, Rights Revolution, supra note 5.
Epp, “Do Bills of Rights Matter?,” supra note 3 at 768.
Epp, Rights Revolution, supra note 5 at 5.
Supra note 8.
Epp, “Do Bills of Rights Matter?,” supra note 3. The Charter was officially adopted in 1982,
but the first case raising a Charter claim did not reach the Court until 1984.
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bill of rights, the justices’ policy preferences, and the extent of judicial discretion
over the docket. Epp suggests that incremental increases above threshold levels of
the support structure lead directly to corresponding increases in the rights agenda.30
Graphing the increase in civil liberties cases over time in five-year increments, he
finds that since the 1960s, there has been a steady increase in the support structure
for rights in Canada. Epp concludes that the increase in the support structure
through increased interest-group litigation, not the change to the Court’s docket
in 1975 or the adoption of the Charter in 1982, caused an increase in civil liberties
cases decided by the Court.31 Epp admits, however, that the slender evidence he
marshals in support of his thesis represents only a “preliminary analysis.”32 Now
that a much larger body of data on the decisions of the Court is available, it is time
for a more systematic analysis of the important question he raises.

III. OTHER INFLUENCES ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOUR
Beyond the debate over the impact of the constitutional protection of rights, there
is broad agreement over the importance of two other characteristics of appellate
courts for their policy making roles: the existence of substantial control by the
justices over their docket and the ideology or political preferences of the justices.
In the United States, empirical scholars have long argued that docket control is
an essential precondition for active policy making by the justices.33 The support
structure thesis suggests that the importance of docket control for policy making in
the United States extends more broadly to other common law courts. For instance,
Epp notes that “the influence of judicial attitudes is likely to depend on … the
extent to which judges can choose which cases to decide.”34 Peter McCormick makes
a similar argument for the transformation of the role of the Court in Canadian
politics, citing the 1975 amendments to the Supreme Court Act,35 which increased
30. Epp, Rights Revolution, supra note 5.
31. Ibid at 775.
32. Epp’s analysis relies on data on the agenda of the Court for seven year-long periods. Each
of these data points are five years apart and reflect the assumption that there was a steady
increase from the agenda of the court in one year to the next sampled point, five years later.
33. Jeffrey A Segal & Harold J Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993) [Segal & Spaeth, Attitudinal Model]; Jeffrey A Segal
& Harold J Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2002) [Segal & Spaeth, Attitudinal Model Revisited]; David W
Rohde & Harold J Spaeth, Supreme Court Decision Making (San Francisco: WH Freeman,
1976).
34. Epp, Rights Revolution, supra note 5 at 14.
35. RSC, 1985, c S-26.
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the Court’s discretionary control of its docket, as constituting a “silent revolution”
that was of “enormous importance”36 in the evolution of the Court from a “bit
player to a leading actor”37 in Canadian politics. As Ian Bushnell notes, “Chief
Justice Laskin used the occasion of this expansion of the Court’s control of its
docket to announce that “the Court’s status as Canada’s ultimate appellate Court”
was finally sealed.”38 Recent assessments of the changing role of the Court are in
agreement that the adoption of the Supreme Court Act of 1975, which expanded
the Court’s discretionary control of its docket, was one of the key changes that
helped to bring about the transformation of the Court.39
Once appellate courts have achieved docket control and possess a substantial
degree of judicial independence, a major determinant of judicial decisions is
thought to be the political values of the justices. While this view of the primacy
of judicial attitudes has long been the conventional understanding of decision
making on the US Supreme Court (USSC),40 substantial evidence exists of the
influence of the political values of the justices in a number of other countries.41
In Australia, for instance, Brian Galligan found that judicial activism played
a role in judicial decisions, despite the absence of an explicit bill of rights.42
Similarly, Stacia L. Haynie,43 David Robertson,44 and George H. Gadbois Jr.45
36. Canada’s Courts (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1994) at 77.
37. McCormick, Supreme at Last, supra note 2 at 2.
38. The Captive Court: A Study of the Supreme Court of Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 1992) at 405.
39. Songer, supra note 6; Lori Hausegger, Matthew Hennigar & Troy Riddell, Canadian Courts:
Law, Politics and Process (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2009); Flemming, “Processing
Appeals,” supra note 2.
40. See Glendon Shubert, The Judicial Mind: The Attitudes and Ideologies of Supreme Court
Justices, 1946-1963 (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965); Segal & Spaeth,
Attitudinal Model, supra note 33; Segal & Spaeth, Attitudinal Model Revisited, supra note 33;
Segal & Rhode, supra note 33; Forrest Maltzman, James F Spriggs II & Paul J Wahlbeck,
Crafting Law on the Supreme Court: The Collegial Game (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2000).
41. Stacia L Haynie, Judging in Black and White: Decision Making in the South African Appellate
Division, 1950-1990 (New York: Peter Lang, 2003); Glendon Schubert & David J Danelski,
eds, Comparative Judicial Behavior: Cross-Cultural Studies of Political Decision-Making in the
East and West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969); Brian Galligan, “Judicial Activism
in Australia” in Kenneth M Holland, ed, Judicial Activism in Comparative Perspective (New
York: St Martin’s Press, 1991) 70.
42. Galligan, supra note 41.
43. Haynie, supra note 41.
44. Judicial Discretion in the House of Lords (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
45. “Selection, Background Characteristics, and Voting Behavior of Indian Supreme Court
Judges” in Schubert & Danelski, supra note 41.
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report finding evidence of the influence of the political values of the justices on
the decisions of the top appellate courts in South Africa, the United Kingdom,
and India, respectively. Turning to Canada, recent works46 have reinforced a
number of earlier studies that noticed the influence of Supreme Court justices’
political values on their decisions.47

IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE ASSUMED PRIMACY OF THE
SUPPORT STRUCTURE
According to those who argue for the primacy of the support structure for the
development of a rights agenda, there are three types of resources—organized
group support, financing, and the structure of the legal profession—that appear
to be important conditions for shaping access to the judiciary.
A long line of research demonstrates that in the United States, groups
participating as amici have a major impact on agenda decisions by the USSC.
The agenda-setting process in Canada, however, is not the same as in the United
States. In contrast to the United States, interest groups as interveners (functionally
the same as amici in the United States) play a less direct role in the leave to appeal
process in Canada. Interviews with the justices on the Court indicate that all of
the justices agree that interest groups are not permitted to participate in the leave
to appeal process.48 This is confirmed by Roy B. Flemming, who reports that
interest group interveners’ “involvement focuses exclusively on the stage after leave
applications are granted… . Interest group interveners are conspicuously absent
in the Canadian agenda-setting process.”49 Indirectly, however, interest groups
might have an effect on the agenda of the Court, given their participation in the
decisions of lower courts from which the appeals are drawn. Interest groups in

46. CL Ostberg & Matthew Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making in the Supreme Court of
Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007); Songer, supra note 6.
47. Donald E Fouts, “Policy Making in the Supreme Court of Canada, 1950-1960” in Schubert
& Danelski, supra note 41; Sidney Peck, “A Scalogram Analysis of the Supreme Court
of Canada, 1958-1967” in Schubert & Danelski (ibid); C Neal Tate & Panu Sittiwong,
“Decision Making in the Canadian Supreme Court: Extending the Personal Attributes
Model Across Nations” (1989) 51:4 J Poli 900; CL Ostberg & Matthew Wetstein,
“Dimensions of Attitudes Underlying Search and Seizure Decisions of the Supreme Court
of Canada” (1998) 31:4 Can J Poli Sci 767; Andrew D Heard, “The Charter in the Supreme
Court of Canada: The Importance of Which Judges Hear an Appeal” (1991) 24:2 Can J Poli
Sci 289.
48. For details of the interview process, see Songer, supra note 6 at 12, 255-59
49. Flemming, Tournament of Appeals, supra note 2 at 13 [emphasis in original].
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Canada have also been active in legal education and judicial training,50 which may
also indirectly influence the Court’s agenda setting.
As direct parties bringing cases to the Court, interest groups also play a much
smaller role in Canada than in the United States. In support of this point, Flemming
notes that interest group participation is at much lower levels in Canada than in the
United States, and in his extensive study of the leave to appeal process,51 he considers
their role to be of so little significance that he does not even discuss them in his
catalog of the major players in the leave process. Similarly, Ian Brodie notes that
in Canada, interest groups participate mainly as interveners, rather than as direct
parties in their campaigns to influence the Court.52 This anecdotal assessment is
supported by Donald R. Songer’s finding that all groups and associations combined,
other than business and labour unions (a category that includes some groups that
have nothing to do with the promotion of rights causes), constituted only 1.7 per
cent of the appellants bringing their cases to the Court between 1970 and 2003.53
These findings are further confirmed by interviews conducted by the authors with
two of the most prominent and influential rights groups in Canada: the Canadian
Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) and the Women’s Legal Education and Action
Fund (LEAF). Both groups told the authors that they relied only on their role as
interveners to influence the rights decisions of the Court. Neither group sponsored
cases and neither participated directly in the leave to appeal process before the
Court.54 Lori Hausegger, Matthew Hennigar, and Troy Riddell note that interest
groups in Canada have a large disincentive against direct sponsorship of cases.55
For example, in Lavigne v Ontario Public Service Employees Union,56 not only did
the National Citizens Coalition, which sponsored the case, lose, but the Court
also ordered that it pay the court costs of the union and groups who intervened
on the Coalition’s behalf.
Together, these findings on the very minor role of interest groups as either direct
parties or interveners in the leave to appeal process cast doubt on the theoretical
underpinnings of the argument that an extensive support structure is critical to the
50. Hausegger, Hennigar & Riddell, supra note 39 [emphasis on original].
51. Flemming, Tournament of Appeals, supra note 2.
52. Friends of the Court: The Privileging of Interest Group Litigants in Canada (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 2002).
53. Songer, supra note 6 at 81.
54. Interview of Kerri Froc, senior official of the women’s Legal Education and Action Fund, by
Donald Songer (12 June 2001).
55. Hausegger, Hennigar, & Riddell, supra, note 39.
56. [1991] 2 SCR 211, 3 OR (3d) 511.

308

(2013) 51 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

rights agenda of the Court. If interest groups play such an indirect role in the leave to
appeal process, then the increase in the number of interest groups in Canadian society
would appear to have minimal influence on the increasing rights agenda of the Court.
Another possible explanation for the substantial increase to the rights agenda of the
Court centres on the changing structure of the legal profession. Of particular note is
the growth of a number of large law firms in Canada and the increasing diversification
(especially gender diversification) in supporting the increasing rights agenda of the
Court. Recently, however, Flemming assessed the factors that influence the success of
leave applications and found that attorneys from large firms are no more successful
than other attorneys in the leave to appeal process.57

V. A MODEL OF SUPREME COURT AGENDA CHANGE
As noted above, prior scholarship suggests that that the rights agendas of courts may
be influenced by the presence or absence of an explicit constitutional guarantee of
rights, the nature of the support structure for rights litigation, the degree of docket
control possessed by the top court, and the political preferences of the justices
on the court. We construct a model of agenda change on the Court to determine
the relative impact of each of these four factors on increases in the rights agenda.
Specifically, we hypothesize that (1) the adoption of the Charter will increase the
proportion of rights cases and the proportion of constitutional cases58 on the agenda
57. See Flemming, Tournament of Appeals, supra note 2. Moreover, while it is plausible to
believe that the increasing gender diversity of the legal profession may make it easier to find
attorneys who will bring gender-equality cases (and perhaps other discrimination cases) to
the Court, the support structure argument for the importance of gender diversity provides
no basis for believing that an increased number of female attorneys is important for bringing
criminal appeals to the Court. This is important, because when Epp’s category of rights cases
is broken down into its specific issue components, it appears that at least from 1970 on,
more than 80 per cent of all of the rights cases are criminal appeals.
58. We use the term “rights cases” sensu Epp—i.e., all cases involving personal rights, freedoms,
and liberties whether brought under the Charter, statutory protection of rights, or common
law protection of rights. “Constitutional cases” refer to all cases in which there is a significant
issue addressed in the majority opinion of the Court involving the interpretation or
application of any provision of the Canadian Constitution. These can involve claims under
the Charter or the Constitution Act, 1867. As indicated below, “rights cases” map only into
the first dependent variable (referred to above as the “rights agenda”). Our conception of
constitutional cases is broader than Epp’s conception. Thus, we note that we test three
hypotheses related to constitutional cases on the agenda of the Court. Below, we indicate
that our second dependent variable is the proportion of cases in which the Court declared a
statute unconstitutional (under either the Charter or the Constitution Act, 1867). This is the
same as a variable used in Epp’s analysis. In the next paragraph, below, we indicate that our
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of the Court; (2) increases in the strength of the support structure for rights will
increase the proportion of rights cases and the proportion of constitutional cases
on the agenda of the Court; (3) increases in the degree of control of its docket will
increase the proportion of rights cases and the proportion of constitutional cases on
the agenda of the Court; and (4) as the ideology of the Court’s majority becomes
more liberal, the proportion of rights cases and the proportion of constitutional
cases on the agenda of the Court will increase.
To test these hypotheses, we constructed a database based on the universe of
published decisions of the Court for a fifty-seven year period (1949-2005). The
unit of analysis is the aggregate composition of the Court’s docket for each year.
To compute the aggregate scores for each year, we supplemented data from the
High Courts Judicial Database (HCJD).59
To assess fully the impact of the Charter on the Court’s agenda, we need to
examine both the proportion of cases that deal explicitly with rights issues as well
as those that tap the role of the Court more generally in constitutional politics.
To accomplish this goal, we created four dependent variables. For each calendar
year, we computed the percentage of cases appearing on the docket of the Court
in four categories: cases raising rights claims, cases in which the Court struck
down a statute as unconstitutional, cases in which the Court either struck down
a statute or overturned the actions of some executive official, and cases in which a
substantial question of constitutional interpretation was discussed in the opinion
of the Court. These four measures of the annual agenda of the Court become our
dependent variables in the analysis below.
For the first dependent variable (the rights agenda), we follow Epp’s conception
of rights cases. That is, we combined all cases raising criminal rights issues with those
third dependent variable is the proportion of cases in which either a statute or the action of
some government executive official was declared unconstitutional (under either the Charter
or the Constitution Act, 1867). In the same paragraph we indicate that the fourth dependent
variable is the proportion of cases in which there was a significant constitutional issue (under
either the Charter or the Constitution Act, 1867) that was considered by the justices.
59. The data and codebooks for the HCJD can be downloaded from the JURI project
at the University of South Carolina. The Judicial Research Initiative, online: <http://
artsandsciences.sc.edu/poli/juri/>. The Canadian data in the HCJD include the universe of
decisions published in the Supreme Court Reports for the years 1970–2003. The authors
coded all of the decisions from 2004 and 2005 and from 1949 to 1969, following the
same coding scheme. The HCJD data are part of a larger project funded by the National
Science Foundation, “Collaborative Research: Fitting More Pieces into the Puzzle of
Judicial Behavior: a Multi-Country Database and Program of Research,” SES-9975323;
“Collaborative Research: Extending a Multi-Country Database and Program of Research,”
SES-0137349, C Neal Tate et al, Principal Investigators.
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addressing traditional personal rights, such as claims relating to equality, privacy,
freedom of expression or political participation, freedom of religion, procedural
fairness, and the rights of language groups and indigenous peoples.
For our second dependent variable, we also follow Epp’s lead, computing
the proportion of cases in each term in which the Court declared a statute
unconstitutional.60 This represents what might be termed a “narrow” version of
the court’s judicial review function.
For the remaining two dependent variables, we employ a broader understanding
of the role of the Court in constitutional politics. Thus, our third dependent variable
is the proportion of cases each term in which the Court exercised judicial review
to strike down either a statute (including provincial laws and local ordinances)
or the actions of some executive official. It thus represents a broader version of
judicial review. The final dependent variable is the proportion of cases each term
in which there was a significant constitutional issue raised. Since one might
argue that a constitutional decision to uphold a statute or administrative action
is as much a part of constitutional law making as a decision to strike one down,
this last category provides the broadest measure of how active the Court was in
constitutional policy making.
To directly assess whether “constitutions matter,” we run separate time-series
models of agenda change for each of our four dependent variables. We create
independent variables to assess each of the four hypothesized influences on agenda
change. For the hypothesized effects on agenda change (hypotheses one and three),
we include intervention variables that mark the dates of institutional change.
Specifically, to assess the impact of the Charter (H1), all years from 1984 onward
are coded “1” and all years before 1984 are coded “0.” Significant expansions of
the degree of docket control possessed by the Court occurred with the enactment
of the Supreme Court Act in 1975, and its subsequent amendment in 1997.61
Thus, all years from 1975 to the present are coded “1” for the variable “Docket
Change 1975,” and all years from 1997 onward are coded “1” for the variable
“Docket Change 1997.” For both variables, the years before the institutional
change are coded “0.”
60. Epp, “Do Bills of Rights Matter?,” supra note 3.
61. In 1975, Parliament granted the Court nearly complete control of its discretionary docket in
civil cases, substantially reducing the number of “appeals as of right” the Court was required
to hear. Ian Bushnell, “Leave to Appeal Applications in the Supreme Court of Canada: A
Matter of Public Importance” (1982) 3 Sup Ct L Rev 479. In 1997, the remainder of the
Court’s mandatory jurisdiction in criminal cases was also largely converted to discretionary.
Songer, supra note 6.
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To tap the effects of changes in the support structure for rights (H2), we
utilize the two measures used by Epp:62 legal aid expenditures by the province of
Ontario and the changing size of Canada’s lawyer population.63 For both sets of
data, we expanded the data so that we would have annual values for each variable
for the whole fifty-seven year period we analyzed.
To measure the ideology of the Court, we computed the proportion of decisions
in rights cases each year that supported the rights claimant (i.e., that supported
a liberal position). We lagged this measure one year.64 We also included in our
models a multiplicative term to assess the interaction of our measure of ideology
with a dummy variable for the agenda change that occurred in 1975.

62. See Epp, “Do Bills of Rights Matter?,” supra note 3. Epp also conceptualized the number
of interest groups supporting rights as a part of the support structure, but because interest
groups do not play a significant role in agenda setting in Canada, as we noted above, we did
not include any measures of the number of interest groups in our model.
63. See ibid. While it might be preferable to utilize a measure of the combined legal aid
expenditures from all provinces in Canada, we followed Epp’s lead in using the Ontario data
as a rough indicator of the impact of external funding of rights cases for several reasons.
First, it appears that comparable data from all provinces are not readily available for the
entire period included in our analysis. In addition, even if such data were available, there is
no obvious best way to weight the data from the different provinces. For example, aid from
Ontario certainly has a greater potential to influence the overall agenda of the Court than aid
from New Brunswick because both the population and the amount of litigation in Ontario
is substantially larger than that in New Brunswick. But empirically, the relative share of the
overall docket of the Court proceeding to cases from Ontario and New Brunswick has varied
over time. Given these problems in devising a perfect measure of legal aid financing, we
concluded that the figures from Ontario would provide an acceptable rough indicator. This
confidence is increased by the finding that there were substantially more rights cases heard by
the Court from Ontario than from any other province (the cases from Ontario constituted
30.3 per cent of all rights cases heard by the Court) and that the correlation in the changes in
the number of rights cases in Ontario and the total number of rights cases heard per year by
the Court is high and statistically significant (r=0.79).
64. The only direct measure of the political preferences of the justices not derived from their
voting behavior on the Court is based on an analysis of newspaper editorials and news stories
published at the time of their appointment. It is constructed in a manner that is analogous
to the Segal and Cover scores, which are widely used in analyses of the behaviour of justices
on the USSC. Unfortunately, this measure is not available for justices appointed before the
1960s because prior to that time, there was virtually a complete absence of media coverage
that discussed judicial appointees in terms of their political preferences. However, for the
period between 1984–2003, Ostberg and Wetstein have shown that this independent
measure of ideology is substantially correlated with the measure of ideology used in our
analysis. Osterberg & Wetstein, supra note 46 at 129.
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VI. TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS
To determine the impact of the institutional interventions, we utilize the BoxJenkins method for Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) timeseries modeling.65 This technique divides the time series into two parts, which
include the time dependent processes and the impact of the interventions. This
model can generally be written as:
Yt = f(Xt) + Nt
Where Yt reflects the dependent time series, Xt reflects the intervention, and Nt
reflects the stochastic noise component.66
More simply, we want to understand the impact that the intervention
variables—the 1982 Charter, the 1975 docket change, and the 1997 docket
change—had on the Court’s agenda. Because we are dealing with a time span of
fifty-seven years and we want to assess the impact these changes or “interventions”
had on the courts agenda, the most appropriate way to do so is to analyze the data
using an intervention model (with an ARIMA specification). The intervention
model essentially flags the occurrence of an event so that one can examine whether
anything changed after the intervention occurred. This more sophisticated method
of analyzing data permits us to understand more fully the nature of the influence
(if any) of the four interventions we identified, rather than simply analyzing the
65. George EP Box & Gwilym M Jenkins, Time Series Analysis: Forecasting and Control, revised ed
(San Francisco: Holden-Day Press, 1976).
66. In order to properly analyze the impact of the intervention variables on the times series, we
estimate our models using ARIMA This is done because the stochastic processes are removed
through the estimation of ARIMA. ARIMA modeling begins on the premise that it is first
necessary to identify what kind of data-generating process is driving the data. See Richard
McCleary & Richard A Hay Jr, Applied Time Series Analysis for the Social Sciences (Beverly
Hills: Sage Publications, 1980). In other words, ARIMA analysis entails model identification
of the (p,d,q) parameters, then estimating, and finally diagnosing the residuals. Specifically,
intervention analysis begins with establishing the ARIMA properties of the series (i.e., the
Nt component). This means that we needed to determine the three parameters (p,d,q). The
“p” parameter refers to the number autoregressive (AR) parameters necessary to fit the time
series. The “d” parameter indicates the number of times the series needs to be differenced (for
stationary purposes). Finally “q” refers to the amount of moving average (MA) parameters
required to fit the series in order to turn it into white noise. This is important because a white
noise time series means that both the mean and the variance are stationary. After performing
the necessary diagnostics for identifying the ARIMA properties (such as examining the
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions, ACF and PACF, examining the
correlograms against lag length, and applying the Dickey-Fuller test) we determined each
model’s ARIMA specification. Because each model has a different ARIMA identification,
please see Tables 1-4 for the ARIMA specification of each analysis.
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data through a set of graphs. Because of the additional years under review and data
collected, we present a more accurate estimation of the impact these interventions
may have had.67

VII. RESULTS
A. TRENDS IN THE COURT’S AGENDA—A FIRST LOOK

Before we discuss in greater detail the results of our times series models, we first
look at the overall trends for the changing agenda of the Court. For a visual
overview of the changing agenda of the Court, we first turn to Figure 1, which
plots the trends over time in the proportion of the Court’s agenda devoted to cases
presenting rights claims. The figure presents data on the docket of the Court for
each year for a fifty-seven year period. The vertical lines in the graph mark three
changes to the Court. The first line marks the Supreme Court Act of 1975, which
gave the Court nearly complete control of its docket; the second line marks the
adoption of the Charter;68 and the third line represents an amendment to the
Supreme Court Act in 1997, which eliminated most of the remaining appeals as
of right in criminal cases.

67. After we determined each model’s ARIMA specification, the next step included adding
the intervention variables to our model. ARIMA treats these intervention variables
much like independent variables in a regression model in that it estimates coefficients
for each intervention variable that best fit the data. After running each model with the
interventions, we determined that the Autocorrelation Function Areas (AFC) and the Partial
Autocorrelation Function (PACFs) errors were within the acceptable limits. Generally
speaking, the PACF is the amount of correlation between two variables and AFC refers to the
amount of correlation between a variable and its lag. If the coefficient estimate is significant,
we can be statistically confident that the intervention had an effect. Finally, in order to assess
whether each model is a reasonable fit to the data, we examined the residuals for each model
by analyzing the ACF and PACF and examining the Box-Ljung statistic (this indicates
whether the autocorrelations are different from zero). The results of these diagnostic
checks for each model indicated the residuals estimated are random, which demonstrated
that the ARIMA model was properly identified. In addition we also examined the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) goodness of fit measure in order to determine the “best”
ARIMA model to use.
68. No one would expect that the Charter would have an instantaneous effect on the agenda of
the Court; cases take some time to work their way up the judicial hierarchy to reach that
level. Thus, in all of the analyses below, we mark the beginning of the Charter effect in 1984,
when the first cases raising a Charter claim reached the Court, rather than in 1982 when the
Charter was adopted.
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B. CHANGE IN THE RIGHTS AGENDA OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
CANADA: PERCENTAGE OF RIGHTS CASES PER YEAR 1945–2005

Figure 1 demonstrates that there has been a dramatic change in the agenda of the
Court that deserves Epp’s description of it as a “rights revolution.”69 There appear
to be two fairly sharp breaks in the data: one occurring with the increased agenda
control gained by the Court in the Supreme Court Act of 1975 and the second
corresponding to the adoption of the Charter. After each of these changes, there
was a sharp upward surge in the proportion of rights cases on the agenda of the
Court, followed by annual fluctuations at the new higher level. For thirty years
following the end of World War II, rights litigation made up a relatively steady but
modest proportion of the Court’s agenda, staying below one-fifth of the docket
in most years.70 However, once the Court gained greater control of its docket,
the proportion of rights cases rapidly increased to between 30 per cent and 40
per cent of the docket. Then, with the adoption of the Charter, a further large
increase occurred in the rights agenda of the Court. In summary, for thirty years
prior to 1975, rights cases made up less than 20 per cent of the Court’s docket
in most years; then, for the next decade, they accounted for between 20 per cent
and 40 per cent in every year. Since the adoption of the Charter, rights cases have
constituted more than 40 per cent in every year and have surpassed 60 per cent
69. Epp, Rights Revolution, supra note 5 at 177.
70. Additional analysis not presented indicates that almost all of these rights cases involved
criminal appeals in the years before 1975.
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of the docket in a number of years. Thus, over time, the attention of the Court to
rights cases has more than doubled.
Figure 1 indicates that the effect of the adoption of the Charter on the rights agenda
of the Court appears to be major. With the adoption of the Charter, the proportion
of rights cases on the docket immediately jumped 15 per cent above the previous year
(and 13 per cent above the average of the preceding three years), and this increased
attention to rights has continued throughout the Charter period. The proportion of
rights cases on the Court’s docket in every year after the adoption of the Charter was
greater than the proportion of rights cases on the docket in any of the nearly forty
years prior to the adoption of the Charter.71
The trends displayed in Figure 1 do not provide much support for the contention
that it was the increasing magnitude of the support structure for rights that provided
the major engine for the increasing attention paid to rights by the Court. For example,
from 1960 to 1975, when the extent of the support structure was gradually increasing,
the trend in the Court’s agenda was essentially flat. Then, immediately after the Court
gained control of its agenda in 1975, the proportion of rights cases on the Court’s
docket increased quickly, jumping from 21 per cent to 26 per cent in the first year,
and never subsequently falling below 28 per cent.
Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that at least most of the changes in the
elements of the support structure thesis, such as the increasing diversity of the bar and
the increasing number of interest groups involved in litigation, continued to increase in
the late 1990s and the early years of the twenty-first century. Thus, the rights agenda on
the Court should have continued to increase in the last decade. But, contrary to these
expectations, the proportion of rights cases on the docket has declined fairly steeply.
After reaching 69 per cent of the docket in 1996, the proportion of rights cases fell
below 60 per cent for all but one of the next nine years. For the 1997–2005 period,
rights cases made up on average only 54 per cent of the Court’s agenda.
C. CHANGE IN THE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATUTES AGENDA OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 1945–2005

Turning to judicial review, a similar though less dramatic change in the agenda of the
Court can be observed in Figure 2. Prior to the adoption of the Charter, there was not

71. Running a simple OLS regression model (not displayed) provides results that are consistent
with this visual interpretation. Using the three Court changes as the only independent
variables, both the 1975 change in docket control and the adoption of the Charter produced
statistically significant increases in the proportion of rights cases on the docket, with the
magnitude of the change associated with the Charter being approximately 1.7 times greater
than those associated with the docket change.
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a single year in which as many as 3 per cent of the Court’s decisions resulted in the
declaration that a statute was unconstitutional. During the Charter period, however,
the Court declared a statute unconstitutional in an average of 4 per cent of its cases.
Looked at slightly differently, the modal response of the Court before the Charter
was a year in which no statutes were declared unconstitutional (in twenty-six of forty
years), though at least one statute has been declared unconstitutional in every year
since the adoption of the Charter. And as we saw in the analysis of the rights agenda,
there is little evidence that the increasing support structure for rights had a more than
negligible effect before the agenda change that gave the Court greater control of its
docket. In thirteen of the sixteen years from 1960 to 1975, no statutes were declared
unconstitutional.
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FIGURE 2: CHANGE IN THE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATUTES AGENDA OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA CASES 1945–2005
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D. CHANGE IN THE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LAWS AND EXECUTIVE ACTION
STRUCK DOWN BY THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 1945–2005

On its face, it would appear that the Charter’s protection of individual rights might
produce a greater increase in the constraint on the abuses of executive power than
an increase in the exercise of judicial review directed at statutes would. Thus, an
analysis of judicial review that only examines judicial review of statutes might
significantly underestimate the overall effect of the Charter on constitutional policy
making. To explore that possibility, we present in Figure 3 the annual trend in the
percentage of all cases in which the Court exercised judicial review to strike down
either statutes or administrative action.
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The trends displayed in Figure 3 are dramatic. In the thirty years before the
passage of the Supreme Court Act of 1975, there was almost no judicial review of any
kind. Subsequently, in the decade before the adoption of the Charter, the average
rate of judicial review rose to slightly above 2 per cent of the cases on the docket of
the Court. But then, with the adoption of the Charter, the rate of judicial review
skyrocketed, rising from a rate of 2.5 per cent per year in the four years before the
Charter to almost 10 per cent in the first two years of Charter litigation. While the
rate of judicial review subsequently fluctuated from year to year, the average rate for
the entire Charter period has hovered just under 10 per cent. Prior to the adoption of
the Charter, there was only a single year in which the rate of judicial review reached
5 per cent; after the adoption of the Charter, there has been only a single year in
which the Court failed to exercise judicial review in at least 5 per cent of its cases. In
a pattern that is very similar to other trends examined to date, there is little evidence
that the support structure that was growing in the 1960s and 1970s had any effect
on judicial review before the adoption of the Supreme Court Act. In fact, from 1960
to 1975, there was not a single year in which judicial review was exercised in even
2 per cent of the cases on the agenda of the Court.
E.

AGENDA CHANGE IN CONSTITUTIONAL CASES IN THE SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA 1945–2005

Our final examination of the trends in involvement of the Court in constitutional
politics comprises an examination of all cases in which the Court was asked by litigants
to resolve a constitutional question. The trends in Figure 4 suggest that the dramatic
increase in constitutional litigation may have been the result of the combined effects of
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increases in the support structure, increasing docket control, and the adoption of the
Charter. After two decades of fluctuation without any clear linear trend, it appears that
the proportion of cases raising one or more constitutional questions began to slowly
rise in the late 1960s, and that this trend then accelerated after the enactment of the
Supreme Court Act in 1975. This trend appeared to increase sharply immediately after
the adoption of the Charter. Thus, starting from a low of no cases raising constitutional
challenges in 1967, the proportion of constitutional cases on the docket rose to above
3 per cent in most of the next eight years and then averaged over 7 per cent in the
decade following the arrival of the Supreme Court Act. But then, as soon as the period of
Charter litigation began, the proportion of cases raising constitutional issues immediately
rose to 17 per cent and never fell below that point again, averaging over 30 per cent
for the Charter period. That is, the average proportion of cases raising constitutional
claims after the adoption of the Charter was nearly double the highest level in any of
the nearly forty years preceding the adoption of the Charter.
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FIGURE 3: AGENDA CHANGE IN CONSTITUTIONAL CASES IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF CANADA 1945–2005
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In summary, for both the rights agenda and for each of our three measures of the
involvement of the Court in constitutional politics, a visual examination of the trends
suggests a major impact of the adoption of the Charter on the agenda of the Court. In
all four graphs, there was an immediate and sharp increase following the adoption of
the Charter. In each figure, it appears that the 1975 change in docket control also was
associated with increases in a rights and constitutional agenda, but the magnitude of
these changes was substantially smaller than those associated with the adoption of the
Charter. In contrast, there is minimal evidence to suggest that an increasing support
structure had an effect on the Court’s agenda that was independent of docket control
and the adoption of the Charter.
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F.

A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF AGENDA CHANGE

The support structure thesis essentially makes two analytically distinct claims. The
first claim is that there has been a dramatic change over time in the agenda of the
Court, a “rights revolution” in which the agenda of the Court has come to contain
an increasing proportion of cases raising rights claims and increasing demands for
the Court to become involved in constitutional policy making. Additionally, it is
asserted that the main causes for these agenda changes are increases in the support
structure for rights. We find that the agenda change on the Court has been so great
that one is justified in labeling it a “rights revolution” (see Figures 1–4). There is
little doubt that the agenda of the Court in the post-Charter period is dramatically
different from its agenda during the 1950s. In essence, Figures 1–4, which cover a
much longer period than Epp’s data, support his basic conclusions about changes
in the agenda.72
According to the support structure thesis, the role of constitutional change is
quite modest. To evaluate more systematically whether the Charter played a role in
this change, we proceed to statistically test the relative impact of the Charter, elements
of the support structure, judicial ideology, and changes to the Court’s docket.
TABLE 1: ARIMA (1,1,1) TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN COMBINED RIGHTS
AGENDA 1949–2005
Variables

Coefficient Estimate

Robust Standard Error

Lagged Combined Rights Agenda

0.237

0.145

Lagged Ideology

-0.085

0.081

Lagged Ideology*
Docket Change 1975

0.240*

0.122

Docket Change 1975

0.084*

0.035

Docket Change 1997

-0.026

0.076

0.118***

0.033

Charter Rights
Lawyers (1000s)

0.002

0.004

0.00057**

0.00021

Constant

-0.0062

0.00196

∑

0.051***

0.005

Wald Chi2

664.68***

Ontario Legal Aid ($ Million)

Log Likelihood

83.22

NOTES: N=55, *p<.05, **p<.01 ***p<.001 (one tailed)

72. Epp, Rights Revolution, supra note 5 at 194-96; Epp, “Do Bills of Rights Matter,” supra note 3
at 777.
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We test these claims with an ARIMA (1,1,1)73 time-series analysis, with
interventions for the three major changes occurring during the time series—the
Supreme Court Act of 1975, which granted greater agenda control to the court;
the amendment to that act in 1997, which further increased the Court’s docket
control by eliminating many criminal appeals as of right; and the adoption of the
Charter. We also model the effects of elements of the support structure and the
conditional effect of changing judicial ideology.
The model indicates that after one accounts for the basic trend in the data, the
effects of changes in the support structure, judicial ideology, and statutory increases
in the ability of the Court to control its docket, the adoption of the Charter had
a major impact on the trend. On average, the adoption of the Charter increased
the proportion of rights cases on the Court’s docket by 12 per cent, a change
that is significant at the .001 level.74 That is, once the data have been differenced
(detrended),75 the evidence suggests that the proximate cause of a significant
increase in the rights agenda of the court is the Charter.
Consistent with the data in Figure 1, the Supreme Court Act of 1975 also had
a statistically significant impact on the docket, though one that was substantially
smaller than the impact of the Charter. In contrast, the 1997 amendments did
not have a significant effect on the rights agenda.76 Docket control, however,
remains an important part of the overall explanation of increases in the rights
agenda because of the strong conditional effect of ideology on the size of the rights
agenda. Increasing liberal preferences among the justices became an important
predictor of increasing attention to rights cases only after the Court achieved
discretionary control over most of its docket. As Table 1 indicates, there is a strong
and statistically significant relationship between increasing liberalism on the Court
and an increase in the proportion of rights cases on the Court’s docket only after
the adoption of the 1975 Supreme Court Act, which increased the justices’ control

73. See supra note 66.
74. That is, there is only one chance in one thousand that the observed change in the proportion
of rights cases occurred by chance or that it is due to random variation naturally occurring in
the agenda of the Court.
75. “Differencing” or “de-trending” is a process to control for autocorrelation. We want to
control for the dependency the value at time “t” has on time “t-1” so that we may observe the
actual values.
76. Epp, “Do Bills of Rights Matter?,” supra note 3. Epp does not discuss the effects of these
amendments since they occurred after the period he studied, but it would be reasonable
to expect them to have a negative effect since they removed from the docket a number of
criminal cases which Epp counts as part of the “rights agenda.”
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over their docket. Before 1975, changes in the ideology of the justices appear to
have had a negligible impact on the rights agenda of the Court.
The time-series analysis provides mixed support in regard to the effect of
changes in the support structure. Increases in the amount of legal aid for indigent
criminal defendants are associated with statistically significant increases in the
number of rights cases on the docket. The magnitude of the effect of an increase
of one standard deviation in the amount of legal aid funding, however, is less than
half of the effect of the adoption of the Charter. In contrast to the support structure
theory, though, increases in the number of lawyers do not appear to increase the
proportion of rights cases heard by the Court.
TABLE 2: ARIMA (2,1,1) TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
STATUTES 1949–2005
Variables

Coefficient Estimate

Robust Standard Error

-0.250

0.209

Lagged Ideology

-0.022

0.017

Lagged Ideology*
Docket Change 1975

0.093*

0.030

Docket Change 1975

0.017*

0.008

Lagged Judicial Review Agenda

Docket Change 1997

0.052**

0.019

Charter Rights

0.018**

0.007

Lawyers (1000s)

-0.002

0.001

0.00019***

0.00005

Constant

0.00083

0.00045

∑

0.011***

0.001

Wald Chi2

474.85***

Ontario Legal Aid ($ Million)

Log Likelihood

167.61

NOTES: N=55, *p<.05, **p<.01 ***p<.001 (one tailed)

We next examine changes in the Court’s use of judicial review. Table 2 presents
the ARIMA (2,1,1)77 time-series analysis of the limited conception of judicial
review (only counting cases in which statutes were struck down) examined by
Epp. The results are quite similar to those for our analysis of changes in the rights
agenda. Both the adoption of the Charter and the adoption of the Supreme Court
Act in 1975, which increased the Court’s discretionary control of its docket, are
related to a statistically significant degree to increases in the use of judicial review
77. See supra note 66.
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by the Court. The magnitude of the impact of these two changes appears to be
quite similar. The adoption of the Charter results in an increase in the proportion
of the Court’s docket devoted to judicial review that is statistically significant (p <
.05),78 even after one controls for the underlying trend in the data and the effects
of the two statutory changes in the Court’s power to control its agenda. Similarly,
the 1997 amendments to the Supreme Court Act, which further increased the
Court’s discretion over its docket, also produced a statistically significant increase
in the number of cases involving judicial review. As noted in Table 1, the impact
of the increasing liberalism of the justices is conditioned upon the Court’s control
of its docket. Once again, the evidence for the effect of increases in the support
structure is mixed. Increases in legal aid are strongly related to increases in the
use of judicial review (p < .001),79 but increases in the number of lawyers do not
lead to similar increases.
TABLE 3: ARIMA (2,1,0) TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
STATUTES & ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 1949–2005
Coefficient Estimate

Robust Standard Error

Lagged Expanded Judicial Review Agenda

Variables

-0.175

0.157

Lagged Ideology

-0.011

0.032

Lagged Ideology*
Docket Change 1975

0.034

0.063

Docket Change 1975

0.028

0.023

Docket Change 1997

0.134**

0.048

Charter Rights

0.069**

0.025

Lawyers (1000s)
Ontario Legal Aid ($ Million)
Constant

-0.009

0.0026

0.00026#

0.00015

0.006

0.003

∑

0.024***

0.002

Wald Chi2

35.75***

Log Likelihood

125.07

NOTES: N=55, *p<.05, **p<.01 ***p<.001, #p=.08 (one tailed)

78. That is, there is only one chance in twenty that the observed change in the proportion of
rights cases occurred by chance or that it was due to random variation naturally occurring in
the agenda of the Court.
79. See supra note 74.
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When one examines the more inclusive conception of judicial review, the effects
of the Charter appear to be even stronger. The ARIMA (2,1,0)80 time-series analysis
reported in Table 3 reveals that on average, adoption of the Charter increased the
proportion of cases per year in which the Court exercised judicial review by close
to 7 per cent, after one controls for the underlying trend in the data and the effects
of the changes in the support structure, the ideology of the justices, and docket
control. This effect of the Charter is significant at the .01 level.81 In this model,
the statutory changes in agenda control adopted in 1997 had even larger and
statistically significant effects on the frequency of the exercise of judicial review by
the Court, but the effects of the 1975 changes were not significant.82 The principal
effect of the 1997 changes was to eliminate appeals as of right brought in a number
of criminal cases. Many of these cases do not raise any significant constitutional
challenges to police or prosecutorial conduct. Moreover, the elimination of these
appeals as of right freed up additional docket space for the Court, and it appears
that the increased space was often filled with challenges to police conduct that were
based on alleged Charter violations. So, the elimination from the Court’s docket of
a number of cases raising no Charter claims and their replacement with cases that
often did raise such claims had the practical effect of increasing the proportion of
cases raising significant constitutional issues.83
Changes in the ideology of the justices on the Court appear to have little
impact on the likelihood of exercising judicial review. Neither the direct nor
80. See supra note 66.
81. That is, there is only one chance in one hundred that the observed change in the proportion
of judicial review cases occurred by chance or that it is due to random variation naturally
occurring in the agenda of the Court.
82. Both the direct effects of the changes in docket control in 1975 and the multiplicative effect
of docket control and judicial ideology failed to reach statistically significant levels.
83. The dependent variable in Table 3 is a combination of cases in which the Court declared
a statute unconstitutional and those in which it struck down an administrative action.
In practice, the latter occurred more frequently. Thus, the majority of cases in which
the dependent variable equals “one” are those in which the Court struck down an
administrative action. Virtually all of these instances of judicial review are taken because of
the incompatibility of the administrative action with the Charter. After the Court gained
greater control of its docket in 1975, Figure 2 indicates that the proportion of cases involving
judicial review of a statute increased. In 1975, though, there was no Charter and therefore
little or no chance for the Court to strike down administrative actions. Thus, the increase
after 1975 in the proportion of its docket involving the expanded conception of judicial
review reflected in Table 3 (i.e., striking statutes and administrative actions) did not increase
nearly as much as it did after the 1997 changes in docket control allowed the Court to
increase both forms of judicial review.
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the conditional impact of changing ideology reaches conventional standards for
statistical significance. As in both of the previous models, evidence of the impact
of increases in the support structure are mixed. Increases in the number of lawyers
in the country did not produce any increase in the exercise of judicial review and
increases in the amount of legal aid produced changes that were only marginally
significant.
To better appreciate the magnitude of the changes to judicial review modeled
in Table 3, one should note (see Figure 3) that prior to the adoption of the Charter,
the Court exercised judicial review in only 1 per cent of its cases—there was not
a single pre-Charter year in which the Court exercised judicial review in as many
as 6 per cent of its cases. Thus, the effect of the Charter on average was to more
than triple the exercise of judicial review by the Court.
TABLE 4: ARIMA (1,1,0) TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN PROPORTION OF CASES
RAISING CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS ON THE AGENDA OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
CANADA 1949–2005
Coefficient Estimate

Robust Standard Error

Lagged Expanded Judicial Review Agenda

Variables

-0.312

0.204

Lagged Ideology

-0.011

0.072

Lagged Ideology*
Docket Change 1975

0.049

0.159

Docket Change 1975

0.012

0.062

Docket Change 1997

0.037

0.099

Charter Rights

0.112*

0.061

Lawyers (1000s)

-0.003

0.0057

0.00010

0.00048

0.001

0.009

0.059***

0.005

Ontario Legal Aid ($ Million)
Constant
∑
Wald Chi2

17.33*

Log Likelihood

76.94

NOTES: N=55, *p<.05, **p<.01 ***p<.001 (one tailed)

Our final analysis involves an ARIMA (1,1,0)84 model of the factors that
impacted change over time in the proportion of cases on the Court’s docket that
raise constitutional questions. The results are presented in Table 4. The dramatic
finding of the analysis in Table 4 is that of all of the potential influences on
84. See supra note 66.
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agenda change on the Court, only the adoption of the Charter is associated with
a statistically significant increase in the proportion of cases raising constitutional
questions. On average, the adoption of the Charter increased the proportion of
cases raising constitutional questions on the Court’s docket by 12 per cent, a
change that is significant at the .05 level.85 Neither the direct nor the conditional
effects of changing judicial ideology were significant and neither of the changes
in docket control produced significantly more constitutional questions. Similarly,
changes in the measures of the support structure for rights are associated with
agenda changes that are small and not significant.
In summary, the results of all four time-series models provide statistical
confirmation of the impressions gleaned from the earlier examination of the trends
in agenda change derived from an inspection of the results presented graphically. The
adoption of the Charter had effects on both the rights agenda and the constitutional
issues agenda of the Court, which were both large and statistically significant.
Support for Epp’s theory, which stated that the most important influences on these
aspects of the “rights revolution” were the changes in agenda control legislated
in 1975 and increases in the support structure for rights, was ambiguous at best.
There was substantial indication that changes in agenda control mattered, but the
effects were not consistent across the four models. Specifically, the Supreme Court
Act of 1975 was associated with increases in rights cases on the agenda and with
increases in our first measure of judicial review. Moreover, in all four of our models,
the impact of the ideology of the justices on agenda change was conditional on
the Court gaining control of its docket. However, increased agenda control did
not appear to contribute to an increase in the most comprehensive measure of the
Court’s involvement in constitutional politics. Moreover, the magnitude of the
direct effect of gaining docket control in 1975 appeared to be roughly only half as
large as the contribution of the adoption of the Charter. Support for the asserted
importance of changes in the support structure was mixed. Two measures of the
support structure were included in the models. The first (increases in the number of
lawyers) was not associated with agenda change to a statistically significant degree
in any of the four models. The second measure (increasing government funding)
was strongly related to agenda change in two models, only marginally related in
one model, and had no statistically significant relationship in the final model.

85. See supra note 78.
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VIII.

DISCUSSION

We are reminded of an important truism that neither constitutions nor any
other institutional features can bring about substantial change all by themselves.
In modern, complex, and pluralistic democracies, almost no major long-lasting
change can be brought about solely through the efforts of a single political actor
or institution. Almost all significant change is the result of interactions among
multiple players and institutions. When multiple actors and institutions contribute
to change, there are frequently patterns of reciprocal influence. Thus, Epp’s
argument—the availability of adequate funding for indigents seeking to raise
rights challenges and rights-oriented lawyers played a role in increasing the rights
agenda pursued by the Court—is almost certainly correct.
The interactions among rights-oriented lawyers and groups, changes to the
Court’s agenda and judicial review, policy agendas of prime ministers, and the
preferences of the justices themselves appear to be complex and multifaceted. For
instance, both Brodie86 and Manfredi87 note the important role played by informal
associations of feminist lawyers and the more formal organizational participation of
the CCLA in debates over the drafting of the Charter. The existence of the Charter,
in turn, provided an incentive for prime ministers interested in rights policy to
consider more carefully the preferences of their judicial appointees. Additionally, once
the Charter was adopted, the incentives were in place for the creation of additional
groups to take advantage of its provisions. The most successful group litigator in
the Charter period has been LEAF. Yet, LEAF was founded after the adoption of
the Charter and the primary reason for its creation was to take advantage of the
possibilities created by the adoption of this constitutional enactment.88 Similarly,
while the CCLA pushed for the adoption of the Charter, prior to the Charter it had
largely attempted to influence policy through legislative lobbying. Following the
adoption of the Charter it changed its tactics and focused its strategy on litigation
for rights. Moreover, as the analysis above demonstrates, the preferences of the
justices who were interested in pursuing a rights agenda had little impact until the
Supreme Court Act of 1975 gave them greater control over their agenda. Thus, the
relationship between the influence of groups, judicial preferences, changing rules
on docket control, and the influence of the Charter on the increasing rights agenda
of the Court appears to be interactive and mutually reinforcing.
86. Brodie, supra note 52.
87. Christopher P Manfredi, Feminist Activism in the Supreme Court (Vancouver: University of
British Columbia Press, 2004).
88. Brodie, supra, note 52 at 30-31.
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The current analysis demonstrates that an increasing support structure had
some effect on the increasing rights agenda of the Court. The more important point
of the analysis above, though, is that even after one takes into account the effects
on the overall trend produced by changes in the support structure, changes in the
degree of docket control possessed by the Court, and the ideology of its justices,
the adoption of the Charter still had an independent effect that was substantively
important and statistically significant. Once the data were appropriately differenced
in an ARIMA time-series model, the robust and significant relationship between
the adoption of the Charter and the agenda increases in rights litigation and
constitutional litigation provide strong evidence that the adoption of the Charter
was an important proximate cause of those agenda changes. In conclusion, the
answer to the question, “Do bills of rights matter?” is “Yes.”
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APPENDIX
Summary Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables for Models 1–4
Variables

Mean

Standard Deviation

Min

Max

Percentage of Combined Rights
Agenda

0.355

0.192

0.094

0.765

Percentage of Judicial Review
Agenda

0.018

0.020

0

0.079

Percentage of Expanded Judicial
Review Agenda

0.041

0.048

0

0.145

Percentage of Constitutional Cases
Agenda

0.140

0.137

0

0.460

Lagged Combined Rights Agenda

0.349

0.192

0.094

0.765

Lagged Judicial Review Agenda

0.019

0.020

0

0.079

Lagged Expanded Judicial Review
Agenda

0.041

0.048

0

0.145

Lagged Constitutional Cases
Agenda

0.140

0.137

0

0.460

Lagged Ideology

0.347

0.119

0.048

0.600

Lagged Ideology*
Docket Change 1975

0.193

0.195

0

0.552

Docket Change 1975

0.544

0.503

0

1

Docket Change 1997

0.140

0.350

0

1

Charter Rights 1984

0.386

0.491

0

1

Depeendent Variables

Independent Variables

Lawyers (1000s)

31.840

21.534

8.800

77.200

Ontario Legal Aid ($ Millions)

108.674

130.059

0

362.600

